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The distinction between knowing how to do something and knowing that something is the 
case is a piece of common sense. Still, it has been suggested that one of these concepts can be 
reduced to the other one. Intellectualists like Jason Stanley (2011) try to reduce know-how to 
propositional knowledge, while practicalists like Stephen Hetherington (2011) try to reduce 
propositional knowledge to know-how. I argue that both reductionist programs fail because 
they make the manifestations of the knowledge to be reduced unintelligible. Contrary to 
both, I suggest that know-how and propositional knowledge are distinct, but conceptually 
interdependent. 
1. Introduction 
The distinction between knowing how to do something and knowing that something is the 
case is a piece of common sense. Still, it has been suggested that one of these concepts can be 
reduced to the other one. Intellectualists like Jason Stanley try to reduce know-how to 
propositional knowledge (cf. Stanley and Williamson 2001, Stanley 2011a and 2011b), while 
practicalists like Stephen Hetherington try to reduce propositional knowledge to know-how 
(cf. Hetherington 2006, 2008, and 2011). Both views have been worked out in much detail on 
which I cannot comment here. But my arguments are independent from these issues. 
I argue that both reductionist programs fail because they make the manifestations of the 
knowledge to be reduced unintelligible. Contrary to both, I suggest that know-how and 
propositional knowledge are distinct, but conceptually interdependent. Before substantiating 
these points, I start with some pre-theoretic remarks about know-how. 
2. Know-how 
The concept of know-how has its point in explaining what Gilbert Ryle, the grandfather of the 
current debate, calls ‘intelligent practice’. He writes: 
What is involved in our descriptions of people as knowing how to make and appreciate 
jokes, to talk grammatically, to play chess, to fish, or to argue? Part of what is meant is 
that, when they perform these operations, they tend to perform them well, i.e. correctly 
or efficiently or successfully. Their performances come up to certain standards, or 
satisfy criteria. But this is not enough. [...] To be intelligent is not merely to satisfy 
criteria, but to apply them; to regulate one’s actions and not merely to be well-
regulated. (Ryle 1949: 29) 
I take it that this expresses the common sense view: First, know-how is a capacity to perform 
an activity well – that is, a capacity to succeed in that activity, to meet its standards. But 
second, not every capacity to meet the standards of an activity amounts to know-how. Not 
every such capacity is intelligent. Know-how involves an understanding of what the activity in 
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question demands – an understanding of its standards. Without such an understanding, one 
could only possess a mere ability or a mere disposition. 
Know-how, by contrast, requires being guided by these standards. It is a skill, an intelligent 
ability – that is, an ability to perform well in an activity in virtue of one’s understanding of the 
standards which govern it. 
Given this background, I shall now turn to my criticisms of intellectualism and practicalism. 
3. Against Intellectualism 
Intellectualism is the view that know-how is a species of propositional knowledge. Roughly, it 
holds that knowledge how to A is knowledge that one can engage in A-ing in certain ways with 
which one is practically acquainted. But intellectualism fails because it leads to a vicious 
regress in the explanation of the manifestation of know-how. 
Ryle has proposed to argue along these lines (1945; 1949), but I cannot adequately discuss the 
different possible interpretations of his texts here (cf. Löwenstein 2011). Instead, I shall 
present what I take to be the best version of the Rylean regress argument. 
Suppose that a manifestation of know-how – like fishing successfully or drawing a correct 
inference – just is a manifestation of propositional knowledge. Then, the intelligence of these 
performances stems from the application of this propositional knowledge to the case at hand. 
After all, having propositional knowledge does not necessarily entail that it always bears on 
practice. But applying propositional knowledge is itself something one may do intelligently or 
not. Thus, it must itself be understood as an exercise of know-how. 
Unfortunately, intellectualism requires us to also reduce these instances of know-how to 
propositional knowledge. This leads to an infinite chain of instances of propositional 
knowledge and leaves us with an inadequate account of the manifestation of know-how. Thus, 
intellectualism is false. 
In order to make this argument as clear as possible, I present an explicit reconstruction: 
1. The explanation of S’s intelligently A-ing must involve appeal to S’s employing their 
knowledge how to A such that S intelligently As. 
2. RA: Intellectualism: Knowledge how to A is, for certain ways of acting  , knowledge 
that (A). 
3. The explanation of S’s intelligently A-ing must involve appeal to S’s employing their 
knowledge that (A) such that S intelligently As. 
4. If S employs knowledge that p such that S acts intelligently, then S intelligently 
applies the proposition that p to the case at hand. 
5. The explanation of S’s intelligently A-ing must involve appeal to an infinite number 
of instances of S’s intelligently applying propositions to cases – namely that 1(A1), 
that 2(A2( 1(A1))), and so on ad finitum – where An+1 refers to the activity of 
intelligently applying the knowledge that n(An). 
6. No explanation of a subjet’s acts may involve appeal to their execution of an infinite 
number of other acts. 
7. Intellectualism is false. 
Of course, premise 4 is the most crucial element of this argument. Everything depends on the 
question what ‘acting intelligently’ and ‘intelligently applying propositions’ come down to. 
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Stanley has rightly stressed that the commonplace understanding of the objection only 
attacks a straw man – that it over-intellectualizes intellectualism. This is because premise 4 is 
understood to hold that the application of a proposition to a case involves separate mental 
acts of considering and applying propositions, and that these acts are intentional actions. But 
there is clear phenomenal support for the view that the application of a proposition to a case 
often proceeds automatically and unintentionally (cf. Ginet 1975: 6-7). Thus, any prima facie 
plausible view – intellectualist or not – will deny that applying propositions to cases always 
involves separate intentional acts (cf. Stanley 2011: 14). 
But unfortunately, this is a red herring: Stanley’s objection only attacks premise 4 if 
intelligent practice is understood as intentional practice. But I have already pointed out that 
what Ryle calls ‘intelligent practice’ are activities which are regulated by standards such as 
efficiency, success, and correctness. Intelligence, in short, is being guided by norms. 
Is applying propositions to cases ‘intelligent’ in this sense? Yes. It is possible to make 
mistakes in applying propositions to a case and it is possible to do so better or worse. Thus, 
this activity is clearly governed by norms. Ryle provides paradigm cases of people who exhibit 
such failures and shortcomings – e.g. the chess player and his maxims and the dull student of 
reasoning and his logical rules (cf. Ryle 1945: 5-7). 
Stanley agrees about these points but disagrees about their consequences. He understands 
applying a proposition to a case as an automatic triggering of a representation of the 
proposition in question: 
Triggering a representation can certainly be done poorly or well. But this does not show 
that it can be done intelligently or stupidly. [...] Since triggering a representation is 
something we do automatically, [...] [premise 4 in the above reconstruction (D.L.)] 
results in a manifest implausibility. (Stanley 2011: 16) 
Thus, Stanley thinks that an activity which is performed well, but automatically, does not 
qualify as intelligent. This is a puzzling view, since automaticity and intelligence certainly go 
together in many important cases. 
Take, for instance, my knowledge how to read. I often read intentionally, but I also often read 
unintentionally and automatically – say, when I happen to see a sign in the street. But both 
are genuine exercises of my know-how. Both are governed by the same norms. Also, reading 
is not unique at all: We sometimes draw inferences or calculate sums automatically and 
unintentionally – according to internalized logical or mathematical principles. Thus, Stanley’s 
view that automaticity excludes intelligence and thereby blocks the regress is mistaken. 
However, this might be just another red herring. Stanley could simply bracket the question of 
automaticity and intentional action and hold that, in my terms, the application of 
propositions is a case of mere ability as opposed to intelligent know-how. But this last option 
also fails. As Ellen Fridland (2012) has beautifully shown, the capacities on which 
intellectualism must rely are clear cases of intelligent skills. For they must somehow make 
distinctions within all the available information and determine which piece of propositional 
knowledge would be the best guide in the current situation. And they must ensure that the 
application of this piece of knowledge actually results in an intelligent performance. 
To illustrate, the propositional knowledge to which know-how is allegedly reducible can be 
individuated in a coarse-grained way or in a fine-grained way. But Fridland shows that either 
option causes serious trouble for intellectualism. 
On the coarse-grained reading, different people can have the same know-how in virtue of 
knowing the same propositions, and one can put the same know-how, the same propositions, 
into practice on different occasions. But then, it becomes an open question how exactly such 
coarse-grained knowledge can guide a person through the endless particularities of any given 
situation. And whatever does this work must be intelligent. 
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On the fine-grained reading, know-how is reduced to great numbers of pieces of propositional 
knowledge, each specifying how something can be achieved for an individual person in a 
particular situation. But then, it becomes an open question how exactly the application-
process selects one proposition from this vast number of ever so slighty different pieces of 
knowledge. Again, whatever does this work must be intelligent. 
The intellectualist reply under consideration would have it that competent people merely 
happen to do these things well without being guided by an understanding of what it takes to 
do them well. But this is absurd. Competences to adjust to the specificities of cases are at the 
heart of intelligent practice. 
I conclude that the regress argument stands to scrutiny. Intellectualism fails. 
4. Against Practicalism 
Let me now turn from intellectualism to practicalism – the view that propositional knowledge 
is a species of know-how. Roughly, it holds that knowledge that p is knowledge how to engage 
in the activities in what Hetherington calls “p’s epistemic diaspora” (2011: 37) – a loose and 
open-ended list of activities including accurately asserting that p, basing decisions upon the 
truth of p, and so forth. But practicalism is bound for a complementary infinite regress in the 
explanation of the manifestation of propositional knowledge. 
As seen above, propositional knowledge can be intelligently applied. But, more broadly, 
propositional knowledge manifests itself when a subject is in some way or other informed by 
her knowledge – that is, when she intelligently acts in the light of this knowledge. 
Suppose that such a manifestation of propositional knowledge just is a manifestation of 
know-how. However, a manifestation of know-how must be understood as a reflective 
exercise of know-how. That is, the subject must employ their understanding of the standards 
governing the activity. 
I have already introduced this pre-theoretic idea above. While I cannot offer a full account of 
the understanding of an activity’s standards here, I shall nevertheless make one a more 
substantive claim: To understand the standards which govern an activity involves at least a 
minimum of knowledge of the sufficient and necessary conditions for meeting those 
standards – that is, propositional knowledge of the form ‘Ceteris paribus, X suffices for A-ing 
well’ or ‘Ceteris paribus, good A-ing is possible only given Y’. Without any such propositional 
knowledge, it is impossible to understand the standards of A-ing. 
Thus, know-how is not exhausted by propositional knowledge – as intellectualism would have 
it. However, it entails at least some propositional knowledge. 
Unfortunately, practicalism requires us to also reduce these instances of propositional 
knowledge to know-how. This leads to an infinite chain of instances of know-how and leaves 
us with an inadequate account of the manifestation of propositional knowledge. Thus, 
practicalism is false. 
As before, I shall now present an explicit reconstruction of my argument. 
1. The explanation of S’s acting intelligently with regard to the fact that p must involve 
appeal to S’s intelligently acting in the light of their knowledge that p. 
2. RA: Practicalism: Knowledge that p is, for certain activities , knowledge how to 
(p). 
3. The explanation of S’s acting intelligently with regard to the fact that p must involve 
appeal to S’s intelligently acting in the light of their knowledge how to (p). 
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4. If S intelligently acts in the light of their knowledge how to (p), then S exercises 
their knowledge how to (p). 
5. If S exercises their knowledge how to A, then S intelligently acts in the light of their 
knowledge that C(A), for at least some sufficient and at least some necessary 
conditions C on meeting the standards of A-ing. 
6. The explanation of S’s acting intelligently with regard to the fact that p must involve 
appeal to an infinite number of instances of S’s exercising know-how – knowledge 
how to 1(p), how to 2(C1( 1(p))), and so on ad finitum – n+1 refers to 
those activities know-how of which is allegedly identical with the propositional 
knowledge that Cn( n(...(p))). 
7. No explanation of a subjet’s acts may involve appeal to their execution of an infinite 
number of other acts. 
8. Practicalism is false. 
Of course, the crux of this argument lies in premises 4 and 5. 
Premise 4 may sound strange. Intelligently acting in the light of one’s knowledge is perfectly 
intelligible when it concerns propositional knowledge. Then, it covers basing decisions upon 
the truth of the proposition known, asserting it, and so forth. However, what could it mean to 
intelligently ‘act in the light of’ know-how? But premise 4 is independent from this general 
problem. Practicalism maintains that all of the examples just mentioned are activities in ‘p’s 
epistemic diaspora’. Intelligently acting in the light of p is therefore understood as exercising 
the know-how to engage in those very activities. Premise 4 is an integral part of practicalism. 
This shifts the burden of the argument to premise 5. Practicalists will probably reply that the 
intelligent exercise of knowledge how to A does not require any propositional knowledge 
about the sufficient and necessary conditions of meeting the standards of A-ing. 
But how could this be true? Know-how is more than a mere disposition or a mere ability. It is 
a skill, an intelligent ability – an ability to achieve something in virtue of one’s understanding 
of what it takes. Thus, rejecting premise 5 requires an account of this understanding which 
does not entail any propositional knowledge. But this is impossible. 
To illustrate, consider the otherwise plausible idea that an understanding of some activity A 
consists in a meta-disposition to correct shortcomings in A-ing. However, if this meta-
disposition is not accompanied by any propositional knowledge about A-ing, then it is only a 
blind regulatory mechanism rather than an understanding of A-ing. 
Compare the following case: I have the ability to digest food and I certainly possess several 
mechanisms which correct shortcomings in my digestive system. Still, I do not know how to 
digest food. After all, these regulatory mechanisms are blind. They do not constitute my 
understanding of my digestive ability. And even those who have such an understanding do 
not digest in virtue of their understanding of digestion, but independently of it. 
I conclude that the regress argument stands to scrutiny. Practicalism fails. 
5. Equal Fundamentality 
I have argued that both intellectualism and practicalism fall prey to vicious regresses. From 
this, we should draw two lessons. 
First, the only option to escape from both regresses is to maintain the distinction between 
know-how and propositional knowledge. 
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How does this stop the anti-intellectualist regress? To intelligently perform an activity and 
thereby to manifest one’s know-how does not require what intellectualism makes it require – 
the intelligent application of one’s knowledge. Unlike propositional knowledge, know-how is 
a species of ability. And qua ability, it can be executed directly, without being applied. 
What about the anti-practicalist regress? To intelligently act in the light of propositional 
knowledge does not require what practicalism makes it require – the reflective exercise of 
one’s knowledge. Unlike know-how, propositional knowledge can inform a performance 
without being activated in the performance, but simply as part of its background reasons. 
Thus, the distinction between know-how and propositional knowledge stops both regresses. 
The second lesson I would like to draw from my findings is that know-how and propositional 
knowledge are distinct, but still interdependent. 
Ryle famously held that know-how is conceptually prior to propositional knowledge since one 
cannot know that p without knowing how to find out whether p and without knowing how to 
use the concepts which are part of the content that p (cf. Ryle 1945: 15-16). I agree. But we 
should also appreciate a complementary insight: One cannot know how to do something 
without having at least a minimum amount of propositional knowledge about the sufficient 
and necessary conditions of meeting the standards of doing so. In this sense, propositional 
knowledge is conceptually prior to know-how. 
Thus, both kinds of knowledge presuppose each other. To possess knowledge at all always 
means to possess two kinds of knowledge states. 
This view retains parts of the respective motivations for intellectualism and practicalism: One 
cannot understand one of these concepts without understanding the other one, too. But the 
dependence runs in both directions. They are equally fundamental. 
One might object that this proposal also leads to a regress problem. For any piece of 
knowledge still triggers an infinite chain of other pieces of knowledge. Knowledge how to A 
requires some propositional knowledge about the standards of A-ing, which in turn requires 
knowledge how to employ certain concepts, and so on. If such an infinite chain of knowledge 
is a problem for intellectualism and practicalism, how can it be all right now? 
I should start by replying that I happily bite the bullet on offer. If we count pieces of 
knowledge, the number of pieces we will find is infinite. This is not an uncommon view – 
holism. It is pointless to try to capture the holistic web of knowledge in terms of a list. 
However, the problem with intellectualism and practicalism is not that they imply this view – 
holism. What these theories were shown to imply is the much more problematic view that 
intelligently performing activities and acting intelligently with regard to facts both require the 
execution of an infinite number of further acts. This is why we must reject them. 
The holistic interdependence of two distinct kinds of knowledge states does not entail that a 
manifestation of knowledge requires the execution of infinite numbers of further acts: 
True, exercising know-how also requires acting in the light of propositional knowledge about 
the standards of the activity in question. But this is where the regress stops. Exercising one 
piece of know-how does not require exercising any further piece of know-how. Having 
propositional knowledge always requires having know-how. But acting in the light of the 
former does not require exercising the latter. When I act in the light of my knowledge that p, I 
do not exercise my knowledge how to find out whether p. 
Thus, both vicious regresses are blocked. 
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6. Conclusion 
I conclude that the distinction between know-how and propositional knowledge is crucial in 
understanding what Ryle calls ‘intelligent practice’, but that the interconnections of these 
concepts are an important topic which should be explored further.1 
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1 I would like to thank my audience at GAP.8 for a lively and helpful discussion. Lars Dänzer, Ellen 
Fridland, Romy Jaster, Nadja El Kassar, David Lauer, David Ludwig, and Holm Tetens have earned 
even deeper gratefulness for their insightful critical and constructive comments on various earlier 
versions of these ideas. 
